

Transport for London

Minutes of the Safety and Security Panel

**Conference Rooms 1 and 2, Ground Floor, Palestra
197 Blackfriars Road, London, SE1 8NJ
10.00am, Wednesday 12 February 2025**

Members

Zoë Billingham CBE (Chair)
Omid Shiraji (Vice Chair)
Seb Dance
Mark Phillips
Peter Strachan

Executive Committee

Andy Lord	Commissioner
Andrea Clarke	General Counsel
Stuart Harvey	Chief Capital Officer
Lilli Matson	Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer

Staff

Jules Gascoigne	Chief Information Security Officer (from Minute 08/02/05)
Siwan Hayward	Director of Security, Policing and Enforcement
Lorraine Humphrey	Director of Risk and Assurance
Claire Lefort	Legal Manager
Stuart Reid	Head of Analysis and Direction
Mike Shirbon	Head of Quality, Safety and Security Assurance
James Varley	Secretariat Officer
Shashi Verma	Chief Technology Officer (from Minute 08/02/05)

01/02/25 Apologies for Absence and Chair's Announcements

There were no apologies for absence from Members. The meeting was quorate. Claire Mann, Chief Operating Officer, was unable to attend the meeting.

The Chair welcomed everyone to the meeting. The meeting was broadcast live to TfL's YouTube channel, except for the discussion of the information on Part 2 of the agenda which was exempt from publication, to ensure the public and press could observe the proceedings.

The Panel's and Executive's thoughts were with the family, friends and colleagues of Jorge Ortega, a colleague who worked for MTR Elizabeth line at Ilford station. Jorge was seriously assaulted on 4 December, and sadly died in hospital on 6 December 2024, while doing his job, helping customers travel around London. Jorge had served the railway community with dedication and kindness for 24 years.

The safety and wellbeing of colleagues is paramount to TfL. Everyone should be able to go about their day without fear or intimidation and it is unthinkable that someone could lose their life due to unprovoked violence while just doing their job.

TfL is working closely with MTR Elizabeth line, to provide support to Jorge's family and to all colleagues affected, and with the British Transport Police to support the investigations and will continue to strengthen safety measures for staff.

The Chair reminded those present that safety was paramount at TfL and encouraged Members to raise any safety issues during discussions of the relevant item or with the appropriate member of the Executive Committee after the meeting.

02/02/25 Declarations of Interests

Zoë Billingham CBE advised that her role at the Security Industry Authority was now that of Associate Non-executive Director, she was previously a Non-executive Director.

All other Members' declarations of interests, as published on tfl.gov.uk, were up to date and there were no interests to declare that related specifically to items on the agenda.

03/02/25 Minutes of the Meeting of the Safety and Security Panel held on 2 December 2024

The minutes of the meeting of the Panel held on 2 December 2024 were approved as a correct record, and the Chair was authorised to sign them.

04/02/25 Matters Arising and Actions List

Andrea Clarke introduced the item, which set out progress against actions agreed at the previous meeting of the Panel.

The Panel noted the updated actions list.

05/02/25 Rail Customer Safety Update

Lilli Matson and Stuart Reid introduced the item, which set out the current status in relation to performance and achieving targets for customer safety on rail modes (London Underground, London Overground, DLR, London Trams and the Elizabeth line).

The Mayor's Transport Strategy established the goal of eliminating death and serious injury from London's transport networks by 2041 and TfL's internal Strategy for Safety set out the interim target to halve customer deaths and serious injuries by 2030. The death and serious injury rate decreased during the coronavirus pandemic and had stabilised, however the recent increase in the number of passengers on the network had seen the absolute number of deaths and serious injuries increase.

TfL had looked across the rail industry to see how it compared. While its performance was favourable, the aim was to continue to reduce risk in line with the Vision Zero goal. It was an industry-wide challenge and TfL was organising a summit with other rail operators to share learning and innovation on addressing passenger/train incidents. TfL had recently

engaged with authorities in Singapore to look at the safety detection systems in use and understand if they could be trialled in London.

The most significant source of risk for customers was slips, trips and falls on stairs and escalators, and for fatal injuries, the Platform Train Interface (PTI) was the area of most concern regarding fatal injuries.

Messaging and educating customers in safer behaviours took place.

The PTI Plan was published in 2024 and was developed to address incidents and would use a systems-based approach. This looks at action to prevent, detect and respond to incidents. There needed to be multiple interventions due to the differing nature of locations and incidents. Trials were being planned to utilise detection technology which needed to be scalable to work effectively on the network.

It was acknowledged that the network was used by customers who could be intoxicated and that intoxication could be a contributory factor in some incidents. Staff were being trained to intervene safely and encourage safer behaviour for all customers. The key was for staff to be empathetic and alert to vulnerability.

Work was also taking place to address deliberate and unauthorised access to the network, with staff also receiving training for suicide prevention.

TfL used data from incidents but did not have the same information gathering powers as the police. It was felt that while more data was useful, the data currently held was sufficiently rich to inform and direct mitigating actions.

Customers, such as those with temporary injuries, or with babies and buggies, or who had some mobility issues, had seen their risk reduced by using step-free access provision.

The Panel suggested that it would be useful to understand how the numbers of slips, trips and falls related to fatalities to see how reductions in risk impacted the full range of outcomes.

It was observed that significant numbers of customers used mobile phones while moving around the network and there may be potential, in the future, to use technology to alert customers when they were in an area of increased risk.

Financial resources were prioritised to keep the TfL network safe and fund trials of mitigation activities..

The Panel noted the paper.

06/02/25 2024 Crime and Antisocial Behaviour Update

Siwan Hayward introduced the item, which provided an overview of recent crime and antisocial behaviour trends on the public transport network and, where possible, compared them with London-wide and national trends.

The availability of data had been impacted by the recent upgrade of Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) systems and the cyber incident in September 2024 affecting TfL systems, and covered the period January to August 2024.

The data showed the risk of being a victim of crime on London's transport network remained low, set against the context of a drive to increase reporting and a changing society.

Significant investment had been made into partnerships with the MPS and the British Transport Police (BTP), as well as TfL's own enforcement function.

Most crime was theft/pickpocketing, and this was seen to be due to the network being a target-rich environment, due to the large numbers of customers using it and crowding. TfL was encouraging customers to be vigilant while the BTP had been proactive to make it a hostile environment to robbery, and this had seen a decrease in offences from 2023 to 2024.

There had been an increase in violent offences of approximately 20 per cent against the same period in 2023. Around 70 per cent of offences were violence without injury, such as pushing and shoving. There had also been a 27 per cent increase in hate crime against a backdrop of wider global issues. Within the hate crime figures, there was significant victimisation of young people, which could lead to long-term concerns about using public transport. Sexual offences had also increased, noting that at present, sexual harassment was categorised as a public order offence, although this would change to a sexual offence soon. A lot of effort was being put into encouraging reporting and engaging with communities to ensure they understood the importance of their safety to TfL.

Customers were surveyed to understand what made them feel safe and this was used to inform actions. The challenge was to balance the direction of capability to ensure customers felt safe on the network while also addressing the highest harm activities.

The Panel noted the increase in crime volume on London Underground over the last three years. Theft was the main driver of the increase and could be attributed to the high value of items carried by customers. TfL worked closely with the BTP and the MPS and had funding arrangements with both forces. There was a focus on high harm crimes but a balance was sought to address theft and pick pocketing. The solution to delivering greater security across the transport network was not simply a case of greater financial resources to fund more policing but to collaborate, share technology and data, and work seamlessly with all parties.

The increase in hate crime was, in part, related to the events of October 2023 and impacted the Jewish and Muslim communities. Action was being taken, which included messaging of the zero-tolerance policy of hate crime. This work had strengthened TfL's relationship with both communities and provided valuable insight.

TfL worked closely with the London boroughs through its Community and Partnership team, as well as through the Greater London Authority. Customer safety was a key part of any dialogue with those bodies.

At the next meeting, the Panel would be updated on what the focus of the next update would be and when it would be scheduled.

[Action: Siwan harm]

Representatives from the BTP and the MPS would be invited to a future meeting of the Panel.

[Action: Siwan Hayward]

The Panel noted the paper.

07/02/25 Safeguarding Customers at TfL

Siwan Hayward introduced the item, which provided an overview of the activity to safeguard those people sleeping rough on TfL's services and infrastructure, and the work to prevent suicide on the transport network.

It was the aspiration for the TfL network to be seen as a beacon of safety, where help and support could be accessed 'under the roundel'.

A structured approach was used, with a specialist team within TfL advising and guiding policy and prioritisation. Frontline and customer operations staff were trained to recognise vulnerable people and be empathetic and aware.

Rough sleeping was a complex issue. People often chose to rough sleep on the network to avoid being found for a variety of reasons and this made it challenging for outreach organisations to assist. TfL recognised that rough sleeping increased the risk of being a victim of crime, resulting in poor health outcomes and was life-limiting and accordingly, worked with outreach agencies to connect people to help and support.

The process for prioritisation of dealing with rough sleeping was informed by complaints and concerns from staff and customers. It was noted that while activity was focussed on TfL property, engagement and assistance would be provided to local boroughs where proximity to a station was a cause for concern.

Suicide prevention was an integral part of safeguarding and staff training was essential. Despite the efforts and vigilance of staff, in 2024, 22 people had died by suicide and a further 15 attempted suicides had occurred on the network where there had not been an opportunity to intervene.

The following staff had received lifesaver awards for their interventions which had successful safeguarding outcomes: Alex at Golders Green station, Joseph and Diana at Westminster station, and Malli, Ladi and Nigel at Manor House station. Panel Members expressed their thanks to staff for their efforts.

It was commended that the British Transport Police (BTP) recognised that responding to mental health issues was part of its role in policing. It was noted that no powers currently existed to allow the BTP to prevent individuals with known conditions and vulnerabilities from entering the network but this was under ongoing discussion.

A multi-agency approach was essential to successfully deliver safeguarding and TfL worked closely with the Greater London Authority. The London Office of Technology and Innovation had worked with London boroughs to develop a dashboard to identify rough sleeping across borough boundaries and consideration would be given to engagement with this work.

The Quarterly Safety, Health and Security Report would include updates on safeguarding and a deep dive would be added to the forward plan. **[Action: Siwan Hayward]**

The Panel noted the paper.

08/02/25 Enterprise Risk Update – Significant Security Incident including Cyber Security (ER04)

Siwan Hayward and Jules Gascoigne introduced the item, which provided an update of Enterprise Risk 04 (ER04) – the risk of a significant security incident (including cyber security).

The understanding of the threat was informed through working in partnership with organisations including the National Protective Security Authority, the National Cyber Security Centre, the police and the security services. This input provided insight into the threats to London and TfL as operator of transport services, infrastructure and technology. The nature of the threat was volatile and rapidly changing, with significant actors in the arena being hostile states, terrorist groups and criminal organisations with interplay between them.

Cyber security was an integral part of security within TfL. An ongoing improvement programme was in place and actions had been taken in response to the cyber incident in September 2024.

It was agreed that cyber security and physical security would be split to create two Enterprise Risks given the size and complexity of both elements. Any lessons learnt, recommendations and improvements identified from the detailed investigation of the cyber incident and the independent review would be picked up as part of this work.

It was noted that the Panel would receive an update on terrorism risk mitigations at the next meeting.

The Panel noted the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.

09/02/25 Safety, Health and Security Report – Quarter 3 2024/25

Lilli Matson and Siwan Hayward introduced the item, which provided key information and trends reported in Quarter 3 of 2024/25 (15 September to 7 December 2024), including performance against Scorecard targets.

The Panel again noted the tragic death of Jorge Ortega, who was seriously assaulted while on duty at Ilford Elizabeth line station. The thoughts of TfL colleagues and Board Members were with the family, friends and colleagues of Jorge.

Colleague safety performance was not on track for the year, due to the fatal incident involving Jorge Ortega and the serious injury numbers being higher than forecast. This was an area of focus going forward. Customer safety performance over the quarter had been challenging, with a tragic fatality at Chalk Farm station on 4 November 2024, and 67 serious injuries across the network. The number of people killed or seriously on London's roads were also higher than target. Bus safety performance was within target.

Engagement took place with stakeholder and user representatives when designing and implementing risk mitigations. This also carried over into the citizenship work and hyper local engagement to inform design. The Panel noted that TfL's safety data related to travel

outside the TfL network, such as boroughs and other transport operators and thus, it was essential to get alignment and agreed principles with other parties.

Delivery of Vision Zero required partnership working with British Transport Police, transport operators and London boroughs. The Panel would receive an update on Vision Zero, which would include short and medium term milestones to help assess performance. This would also explain how performance trajectories may be subject to change, arising from differing travel patterns and changes in risk. **[Action: Lilli Matson]**

Colleague sickness absence performance was broadly on the same trend as last year. The top three causes of long-term absence were mental health, musculoskeletal and work-related accidents/assaults. Work was taking place to improve rates and early intervention, particularly in the case of trauma related incidents, had been seen earlier returns to work. A pilot project was taking place to engage with managers in the trains and depots' teams to equip them with a full understanding of the wellbeing provision and referral process and this had seen positive results in terms of earlier returns to work for staff. The benefits to both colleagues and TfL as an employer were well understood. Data on cancer related absence would be clarified at the next meeting. **[Action: Lilli Matson]**

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch had issued a report into the tragic death of a customer who died after falling onto the tracks at Stratford station in December 2023. TfL welcomed the recommendations from the investigation into this incident, which aligned with the findings of TfL's own internal investigation, and work had already begun to implement them.

In June 2024, TfL commissioned an independent review of safety governance within the organisation. The overall finding was that current safety performance was good when benchmarked against other UK transport providers and the general trend is one of continuing improvement, but set out recommendations to further improve performance. An action plan had been produced and work would take place to track the recommendations. The report would be published on the TfL website.

The report set out the work-related violence and aggression performance and this had been overshadowed by the tragic death of Jorge Ortega at Ilford station.

The Panel noted the report.

10/02/25 Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 3 2024/25

Lorraine Humphrey introduced the item, which provided the Panel with an overview of the status of and changes to Enterprise Risk 01 (ER01) – 'Inability to deliver safety objectives and obligations', and Enterprise Risk 04 (ER04) – 'Significant security incident including cyber security'. It also summarised the findings from the associated assurance activity of these risks based on second line of defence audit work by the Quality, Safety and Security Assurance team and third line of assurance work by the Internal Audit team within TfL's Risk and Assurance Directorate during Quarter 3 of 2024/25 (15 September to 7 December 2024).

ER01 was being redeveloped and would be reviewed by the TfL Executive Committee in May 2025. The Audit Plan for the first half of 2025/26 was being finalised and would be presented to the Audit and Assurance Committee in March 2025.

An audit on 'Cubic Risk Management' under ER04 had been deferred so as not to deflect resources from the cyber incident recovery process.

Fifteen audits against the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard that related to ER04 had been cancelled in Q3 as these audits would now be undertaken by the TfL Technology and Data Payment Operations and Assurance team.

There had been a reduction in overdue actions, moving from 24 open and 10 overdue in the previous quarter to 27 open and two overdue in Quarter 3.

The Panel noted the paper and the exempt supplementary information on Part 2 of the agenda.

11/02/25 Members' Suggestions for Future Discussion Items

Andrea Clarke introduced the item. No additional suggestions were raised for future discussion items on the forward plan, other than those already noted during the meeting.

The Panel noted the forward plan.

12/02/25 Any Other Business the Chair Considers Urgent

There was no other urgent business to discuss.

13/02/25 Date of Next Meeting

The next scheduled meeting of the Panel would be held on Monday 19 May 2025 at 11.00am.

14/02/25 Exclusion of the Press and Public

The Panel agreed to exclude the press and public from the meeting, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended), when it considered the exempt information in relation to the items on: Enterprise Risk Update - Significant Security Incident including Cyber Security (ER04); and Risk and Assurance Report Quarter 3 2024/25.

The meeting closed at 12.45pm.

Chair: _____

Date: _____